Abstract. This paper evaluates the preimage resistance of the Tiger hash function. We will propose a pseudo-preimage attack on its compression function up to 23 steps with a complexity of 2 181 , which can be converted to a preimage attack on 23-step Tiger hash function with a complexity of 2 187.5 . The memory requirement of these attacks is 2 22 words. Our pseudo-preimage attack on the Tiger compression function adopts the meet-in-the-middle approach. We will divide the computation of the Tiger compression function into two independent parts. This enables us to transform the target of finding a pseudo-preimage to another target of finding a collision between two independent sets of some internal state, which will reduce the complexity. In order to maximize the number of the attacked steps, we derived several properties or weaknesses in both the key schedule function and the step function of the Tiger compression function, which gives us more freedom to separate the Tiger compression function.
Introduction
Tiger is a cryptographic hash function designed by Anderson and Biham [1] . It adopts the well-known Merkle-Damgård structure, and produces 192-bit hash digests. Throughout this paper, "Tiger" and "tiger" are referred to as the Tiger hash function and the Tiger compression function respectively. This paper will evaluate the preimage resistance of Tiger. If Tiger is secure, it should take no less than 2 192 tiger computations to find a preimage of a given hash digest. At WEWoRC 2007, Indesteege et al. proposed a preimage attack on Tiger reduced to 13 steps with a complexity of 2 128.5 [2] , where the full version of Tiger consists of 24 steps. At FSE 2009, Isobe et al. published another preimage attack on Tiger, which extended the number of the attacked steps to 16 with a complexity of 2 161 and a memory requirement of 2 32 words [3] . At AFRICACRYPT 2009, Mendel published his preimage attack on Tiger up to 17 steps with a complexity of 2 185 and a memory requirement of 2 160 words [4] .
Besides preimage resistance, cryptographers also pay attention to the collision resistance of Tiger. Several papers have been published to evaluate the collision resistance of Tiger [5] [6] [7] . Here we only point out that the maximum number of the attacked steps of Tiger in the sense of collision resistance is 19 [6] .
Our contributions. This paper will propose a preimage attack on Tiger up to 23 steps with a complexity of 2 187.5 tiger computations, which are lower than the exhaustive search complexity. This attack is based on a meet-in-the-middle pseudo-preimage attack on tiger with a complexity of 2 181 . The memory requirement of the above attacks is 2 22 words. A comparison with previous related works is shown in Table 1 . The applicability of the meet-in-the-middle pseudo-preimage attack on tiger essentially depends on the existence of two sets of message words independent from each other and suitable for applying the attack. This paper denotes the independent sets of message words as independent chunks. If such independent chunks do exist as a matter of fact (maybe cryptographers have not found them yet), the preimage resistance of Tiger will surely be broken by the meet-inthe-middle attack. In order to evaluate the maximum number of the attacked steps, we exploit all the properties we found on tiger. From its key schedule function, we derive several properties which can be adopted to make message words independent from each other. In specific, we use the following properties. 1) Bit-shift operations eliminate some information. This gives more freedom to search for independent chunks. 2) In our attack, we add several least significant bits of two variables and several most significant bits of the same two variables. The large word-size (64 bits) helps us to make these two additions independent because the carry from the lower bits is hard to transmit to the upper bits due to the large number of intermediate bits. 3) Even if Tiger uses addition, subtraction, and XOR as its operations, they can be linearized by setting conditions, and it is possible to cancel two different operations. From its step function, we find several properties that enable us to make the related techniques work for more steps. Finally we find the independent chunks that can be applied for a preimage attack on Tiger reduced to 23 out of 24 steps.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 describes the specification of Tiger. Section 3 introduces the meet-in-the-middle preimage attack procedure on Tiger. Section 4 shows our independent chunks feasible up to 23 steps. Section 5 illustrates the preimage attack procedure. Section 6 gives a conclusion.
Specification of Tiger
An input message M of Tiger will be padded and then divided into 512-bit message blocks {M 0 , M 1 , . . . , M l−1 }. The padding rule is simple: first add a single '1', then add a minimum number of '0's to make the bit length become 448 modulo 512, and finally add the bit length of the original M to the last 64 bits. Message blocks will be fed into tiger sequentially from M 0 until M l−1 as follows:
where h 0 is a public constant and each h i from {h 0 , . . . , h l } has 192 bits. h l is the hash digest of M .
Specification of tiger.
The inputs h i and M i are divided into 64-bit variables, denoted as (A 0 , B 0 , C 0 ) and (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X 7 ) respectively. Correspondingly addition, subtraction, and multiplication are carried out with modulo 2
64 . Hereafter we will omit the description "modulo 2 64 " for simplicity. tiger consists of 24 step functions, regrouped into three 8-step passes. The step function at step t (1 ≤ t ≤ 24) is as follows, which is also shown in Fig. 1 :
where s t−1 is a constant, even(·) and odd(·) are two non-linear functions based on S-boxes, and X t−1 (9 ≤ t ≤ 24) is derived from {X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X 7 }. The constant s t−1 differs for each pass, which is 5, 7, and 9 for the first, second, and third passes respectively. Details of even(·) and odd(·) are as follows: Here we will pick (X 8 , · · · , X 15 ) as an example to describe the details of KSF .
where const 1 and const 2 are 0xA5A5A5A5A5A5A5A5 and 0x0123456789ABCDEF respectively, and ¬ means bitwise complement. KSF is invertible. We will denote by KSF −1 the inverse computation of KSF in this paper. Finally the output h i+1 is computed as follows:
3 Meet-in-the-middle preimage attack on Tiger This section introduces the application of a meet-in-the-middle attack procedure, which was proposed by Aoki et al. [8] , to preimage attacks on Tiger. Isobe et al.'s preimage attack on Tiger up to 16 steps adopted this meet-in-the-middle attack approach [3] .
Notations
The notations in Table 2 are used to explain the meet-in-the-middle preimage attack procedure. We will describe (X 2 i , X j ) as independent words, and (X 2 , X ) as independent chunks. X t ∈ X 2 sometimes is denoted as X Similarly X t , X
,2 t
and X * t denote X t ∈ X , X t ∈ X ,2 and X t ∈ X * respectively. During the independent computations of E 2 and E , the internal states will be denoted as (A 2 , B 2 , C 2 ) and (A , B , C ) correspondingly.
Meet-in-the-middle preimage attacks on Tiger
A preimage attack on Tiger is constructed by combining a meet-in-the-middle pseudo-preimage attack on tiger and a meet-in-the-middle attack on MerkleDamgård structure.
Pseudo-preimage attacks on tiger. tiger is designed following the DaviesMeyer scheme. Recall the structure of Davies-Meyer: Fig. 2 . The high-level description of finding a pseudo-preimage (h, M ) for a given value h is as follows.
1. Set a random value to h, which also fixes the output of E as h ⊕ h. 2. For all the values of X , calculate E (h, X ), and store them in a table T .
For each value of
, and compare it with all the elements in T . If it is equal to one element in T , a pseudo-preimage of h is found. 4. If no pseudo-preimage is found after trying all the values of X 2 , change the value of h at step 1, and repeat steps 2 − 4.
Suppose there is enough degree of freedom for the independent chunks. The above meet-in-the-middle attack procedure only takes 2 96 tiger computations and 2
96 memories to find a pseudo-preimage with a good probability. Moreover, the above attack procedure can be transformed to a memoryless meet-in-themiddle attack [9] , where the complexity becomes 2 97 tiger computations.
Meet-in-the-middle attacks on Merkle-Damgård [10] . m are tried, one preimage will be found with a good probability. The total complexity is 2 memories, which will be lower than the exhaustive search complexity as long as s < 190.
Related techniques
The applicability of the meet-in-the-middle pseudo-preimage attack on tiger depends on whether suitable independent chunks exist in X 0 || · · · ||X 23 . The example in Section 3.2 is the simplest case. Usually the attacker has to deal with more complicated cases. Cryptographers have developed several techniques for more complicated cases. Aoki et al. proposed splice-and-cut, partial-matching and partial-fixing [8] . Sasaki et al. proposed initial-structure [11] .
Splice-and-cut. This technique is based on the fact that once the value h is determined, the output of E will be fixed as h ⊕ h. Therefore, the first step and the last step of E can be regarded to be consecutive. For example, the attacker obtains the independent chunks as follows: X 0 || · · · ||X 23 −→ X ||X 2 ||X , which is also shown in Fig. 3 . Obviously, the procedure in Section 3.2 cannot be applied directly. However, by adopting the splice-and-cut technique, the attacker will randomly determine the internal state IS, where X and X 2 separate from each other, and then compute E and E 2 independently. Partial-matching and partial-fixing. These two techniques are based on the fact that the output of one step function can be partially determined with the knowledge of only part of the input. Therefore internal states at different step positions can be partially compared if their step distance is reasonable. For instance, the attacker obtains the independent chunks as follows:
, which is also shown in Fig. 4 . In such a case, during applying the attack procedure in Section 3.2, the internal state E (h, X ) is not at the same step position as the internal state E 2 (h ⊕ h , X 2 ), but with a severalstep distance. By adopting the partial-matching and partial-fixing techniques, E (h, X ) and E 2 (h ⊕ h , X 2 ) will be partially compared.
Initial-structure. We will pick an example to illustrate this technique. Suppose the attacker obtains two independent chunks as follows:
, which is also shown in Fig. 5 . By adopting the initial-structure technique, for each value of X , the attacker generates a corresponding IS . For each value of X 2 , the attacker generates a corresponding IS 2 . Moreover, for any pair of (IS , X ) and any pair of (IS 2 , X 2 ), IS always matches with IS 2 using X ,2 . Therefore, the attacker can carry out the independent calculations E and E 2 using (IS , X ) and (IS 2 , X 2 ) respectively.
Our independent chunks
As we discussed in Section 3, one most important part of the meet-in-the-middle pseudo-preimage attack on tiger is how to separate the message words into two independent chunks (X 2 , X ), which is hard because the key schedule function of tiger is complicated. We implemented an automated independent chunk search program based on several properties of the key schedule function and the step function of tiger that we found. For the details of our program, refer to the full version of this paper [12] . This section will describe the independent chunks, which can be used to attack 23-step tiger. The independent words are X 15 and X 23 , which will be denoted as X Table 3 . Our independent chunks 
The independent chunk X
This section will explain the independence/dependence from X 23 for each message word in detail. In this section the notation X * i (resp. Y * i ) means that X i (resp. Y i ) is independent from X 23 . Roughly speaking, we will first regard the message words X 16 , . . . , X 22 as independence from X 23 , and then determine the relation between the other message words and X 23 backwards utilizing the properties of KSF −1 . Before explaining the details for each message word, we point out that several conditions are set on the message words in order to make this chunk work, which are listed in Table 4 . We can only change the 19 MSBs of X 23 in order to make Y 9 be independent from it. More details are given below. 
The 19 MSBs of Y 2 will change with X 23 . From one condition in Table 4 : X 10,63−45 = 0 · · · 0, we can get that Y 2,63−45 = X 9,63−45 = ¬Y 15,63−45 .
19)) Because Y 7 will only change its 19 MSBs with X 23 , which disappear after the bit-shift operation, X *
19) is independent from X 23 . Therefore the 19 MSBs of Y 1 will change with X 23 . From three conditions in Table 4 -
The 19 MSBs of X 7 will change with X 23 . From one condition in Table 4 : -
19) Y 1 only changes its 19 MSBs with X 23 , which will disappear after the bit-shift operation. So (¬Y 1 ) 19 is independent from X 23 . The 19 MSBs of X 3 will change with X 23 . Here we cannot determine the relation between X 3,63−45 and Y 15,63−45 , but it is actually not necessary for this chunk. The reason is that step 4, where X 3 is used, will be skipped by the partial-matching and partial-fixing techniques. More details are shown in Section 5.3.
Since Y 2 and Y 1 will only change their 19 MSBs with X 23 , the 45 LSBs of X 2 , namely X 2,44−0 , will be independent from X 23 . From one condition in Table 4 Table 4 . X 2,63−45 does not change with X 23 . Therefore X 2 is independent from X 23 .
-
Similarly the 45 LSBs of X 1 , namely X 1,44−0 , are independent from X 23 . Table 4 , so X 1,63−45 does not change with X 23 . Therefore X 1 is independent from X 23 .
Similarly X 0,44−0 is independent from X 23 . From one condition in Table 4 Table 4 , so X 0,63−45 is also independent from X 23 . Therefore X 0 is independent from X 23 .
The independent chunk X 2
This section will explain the independence/dependence from X 2 15 for each message word in detail. In this section, the notations
. Roughly speaking, we will first define the message words X 8 , . . . , X 14 are independent from X 2 15 , and then determine the relation between the other message words and X 2 15 backwards and forwards utilizing the properties of KSF −1 and KSF respectively. We point out that the independence/dependence of the other message words from X 2 15 is determined just following the specifications of KSF and KSF −1 . We only need to pay attention to make sure that this chunk does not influence the bit positions, where the conditions in Table 4 are set, in order to guarantee the two chunks are really independent. Note that all the conditions in Table 4 locate at upper bits. We decide to change several lower bits of X 2 15 in order to avoid bit overlap at some message word. Finally we will change bits 19 − 9 of X 2 15 , namely X 15,19−9 .
3 Moreover, in order to clearly make sure that this chunk will not influence the conditions in Table 4 , we set several conditions on the message words to control bit-carry propagations, which are listed in Table 5 . In the following discussion, we will mainly pay attention to which bit positions of the message words will change with X Table 5 : X 15,20 = 0 and X 14,20 = const 2, 20 , no carry will occur from bits 20 to 21 no matter how X 15 change its bits 19 − 9. Therefore, only Y 7,20−9 will change with X 2 15 .
3 The reason why we choose 11 lower bits is because of our attack procedure in Section 5.4.
19)) From two conditions in 
From two conditions in -
X 7,20−9 will change with X 2 15 .
19)) Since no condition has been set on X 3 in Table 4 , we do not need to pay attention to which bit positions of X 3 will change with X 2 15 , but only the fact that it will change with X 2 15 .
From two conditions in Table 5 -
X 1,40−9 will change with X 2 15 . Table 5 : Y 0,22 = 0 and X 7,22 = const 1, 22 , no carry will occur from bits 22 to 23 during Y From two conditions in From two conditions in Step 3d.
Preimage attack on Tiger
Our pseudo-preimage attack on tiger can be converted to a preimage attack on Tiger adopting the meet-in-the-middle attack on Merkle-Damgård structure detailed in Section 3.2. The complexity is 2 187.5 and the memory requirement is 2 22 words. Note that we have to fix bit 56 of X 6 to be '1' and the 9 LSBs of X 7 to be binary-encoding of 447 in order to make the bit length matched.
Open discussion and conclusion
Compared with the MD4-family, Tiger uses a stronger key schedule function, a stronger step function, but a smaller number of steps. However, based on our analyses, we found several properties of both the key schedule function and the step function, which can be used for the preimage attack.
For the key schedule function, we found the following properties.
-Bit-shift is easily used to introduce independence of computations.
-The large word size is suitable to make upper and lower bits independent with respect to carry. -Mixing the use of addition, subtraction and XOR does not introduce enough non-linearity. They can be linearized by setting conditions. For the step function, we found the following properties.
-Even though the whole internal state is updated at each step function, a part of internal state (A t , B t ) are updated by using independent values (only even bytes and only odd bytes of C t−1 ⊕ X t−1 ). -Tiger's S-boxes are so-called target heavy, which map 8-bit values to 64-bit values. This enables us to obtain the knowledge of a large number of bits by only guessing the values of a small number of bits, and later efficiently find out the correct guesses by matching the large bits.
So far, we have not found a preimage attack on full-step Tiger yet. 4 However, by considering the future attack improvement, the number of steps seems a little bit small with respect to the preimage resistance. For the confidence of security, we suggest that the number of steps should be increased.
Conclusion
This paper presented a meet-in-the-middle pseudo-preimage attack on tiger up to 23 steps with a complexity of 2 181 . This was converted to a preimage attack on 23-step Tiger with a complexity of 2 187.5 . The memory requirement of our attacks is 2 22 words.
